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HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
Survey period occurred through judicial decisions.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
In De Gonzalez v. Guilbot the Texas Supreme Court addressed when
jurisdiction over a removed action revests in state court following a fed-
eral court's remand order.1 The supreme court previously held that re-
vesting of jurisdiction happens "when the federal district court executes
the remand order and mails a certified copy to the state court."' 2 The
Guilbot defendants advocated a literal interpretation of this rule, arguing
that because plaintiffs' counsel hand-delivered a certified copy of the re-
mand order for filing, jurisdiction did not revest in state court.3 The su-
preme court rejected this "unduly rigid reading" of its prior opinion and
held that hand-filing the removal order sufficiently transferred jurisdic-
tion from federal to state court.4
The Texas Supreme Court's opinion in In re United Services Automo-
bile began by lamenting the "antiquated jurisdictional patchwork" in
which trial courts operate in Texas.5 The supreme court noted that one
safety net for trial practitioners navigating this complex scheme is the
statute that tolls limitations if a case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
so long as it is refiled in the proper court within sixty days.6 In United
* B.A., Dickinson College; J.D., New York University School of Law. Partner,
Figari & Davenport, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.S., University of Colorado; J.D., Boston University School of Law. Partner,
Figari & Davenport, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
*** B.B.A., University of Texas; J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School
of Law. Partner, Figari & Davenport, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. DeGonzalez v. Guilbot, 315 S.W.3d 533, 534 (Tex. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
951 (2011).
2. Quaestor Invs., Inc. v. Chiapas, 997 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Tex. 1999).
3. Guilbot, 315 S.W.3d at 536-37.
4. Id. at 537-38. Defendants did not help their cause by further asserting that it was
also too late for the federal court to act, and therefore neither the federal nor the state
court had jurisdiction over the case. Id. The supreme court curtly disposed of this argu-
ment, rejecting the idea that "the case now exists in a strange procedural twilight zone."
Id. at 538.
5. In re United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 302-04 (Tex. 2010).
6. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.064(a) (West 2008); United Servs., 307
S.W.3d at 304.
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Services, the supreme court held this statute applied to a claim for viola-
tions of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, rejecting the con-
tention that the statute's two-year deadline for filing suit is
"jurisdictional" and that tolling is therefore unavailable. 7 Nevertheless,
the plaintiff was not able to avail himself of the statute's tolling because
his attorney intentionally filed his case in county court with full knowl-
edge that the damages sought exceeded the court's jurisdictional limit,
not because of a good faith, mistaken belief as to the court's jurisdiction.8
During the Survey period, sovereign immunity became the subject of
two notable decisions. The Texas Supreme Court held several years ago
that a governmental entity can waive its immunity from suit by asserting
its own affirmative claims for monetary damages.9 In Texas Department
of Criminal Justice v. McBride; however, the supreme court clarified that
a governmental entity does not waive immunity when the entity is sued,
merely by asserting a defensive claim to recover attorneys' fees. 10
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the effect of the federal Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) on Texas's sovereign immunity in Uni-
versity of Texas at El Paso v. Herrera." Although the supreme court rec-
ognized the FMLA expressly provides that states are subject to claims
under the FMLA, it held that Congress exceeded its constitutional au-
thority when it attempted to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity with
respect to claims under the so-called "self-care" provision, which entitles
workers to leave due to their own serious health conditions.' 2 The major-
ity specifically explains that Congress's authority to abrogate immunity
under the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to situations where it is nec-
essary to remedy a specific constitutional injury by the states. 13 The su-
preme court concluded that, unlike the FMLA provisions protecting
workers (often female) who take leave to care for family members, noth-
ing in the legislative record suggested that Congress intended the self-
care provision to remedy gender discrimination with respect to personal
medical leave. 14
Finally, the Dallas Court of Appeals in In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B.
held that the Texas courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over same-sex
divorce cases.' 5 The parties here were lawfully married in Massachusetts
two years before moving to Texas. Because both the Texas Constitution
7. Id. at 310-11.
8. Id. at 313.
9. Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 378 (Tex. 2006).
10. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. McBride, 317 S.W.3d 731, 732 (Tex. 2010).
11. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso v. Herrera, 322 S.W.3d 192, 193 (Tex. 2010).
12. Id. at 201.
13. Id. at 195 (citing Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003)).
14. Herrera, 322 S.W.3d at 198-99. The supreme court also rejected the plaintiff's
contention that a single sentence in the university's employee handbook stating that an
eligible employee may bring a FMLA action sufficiently waived sovereign immunity. Id. at
201.
15. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet.
filed).
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and Family Code declare same-sex marriages void;16 however, the court
of appeals held the district court was prohibited from giving any legal
effect to the parties' marriage, thereby depriving it of subject matter juris-
diction over proceedings to dissolve such marriages.17 The court of ap-
peals also held that Texas law in this regard does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 18
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The Dallas Court of Appeals rejected a defaulting defendant's novel
challenge to the sufficiency of service in Tucker v. Tucker.'9 Specifically,
the defendant argued the record failed to show valid service because a
copy of the petition was not attached to the return of service filed in the
trial court.20 However, the court of appeals found no authority requiring
the petition to be attached to the return and, because it was already in the
record, no reason to require another copy of the petition to accompany
the return.21 The court of appeals also summarily rejected the defen-
dant's complaint that he did not sign the return of service, noting there is
no such requirement in Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 107.22
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
The Texas Supreme Court also clarified the burdens of pleading and
proof on special appearance in Kelly v. General Interior Construction,
Inc.23 The supreme court reiterated the rule that where a plaintiff fails to
adequately plead jurisdictional facts, an out-of-state defendant can satisfy
his burden on special appearance by proving he does not reside in
Texas.24 Here, although the plaintiff alleged tortious conduct on the de-
fendants' part, the plaintiff did not allege (or offer proof) that such con-
duct occurred in Texas. 25 The supreme court explained the mere fact that
16. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(b) (West 2006).
17. J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 659.
18. Id. The court refused to consider other constitutional challenges in a supplemental
opinion on motion for en banc reconsideration, including those based on the rights to free
association and travel, that the parties failed to raise in the trial court. Id. at 681.
19. Tucker v. Tucker, No. 05-09-01203-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 9272, at *3 (Tex.
App.-Dallas Nov. 22, 2010) (mem. op.), pet. denied, 2011 Tex. LEXIS 367 (Tex. May 6,
2011).
20. Id. at *3-4.
21. Id. at *4.
22. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107; Tucker, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 9272, at *4.
23. Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010).
24. Id. at 658-59. The supreme court also noted that a plaintiff should amend in order
to allow the special appearance to be determined based on the evidence where jurisdic-
tional allegations are wholly lacking in the plaintiff's original pleading. Id. at 659. In Alli-
ance Royalties, LLC v. Boothe, 329 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.);
however, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Kelly does not restrict a trial court to
looking only to a plaintiff's petition, but the trial court may also consider the plaintiff's
response to a special appearance in determining whether the plaintiff met his initial burden
of alleging facts supporting the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at
120.
25. Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659-60.
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a plaintiff may possess a cause of action "does not automatically satisfy
jurisdictional due process concerns. '26
Two additional Texas Supreme Court cases during the Survey period
provide guidance on sufficiency of a foreign manufacturer's contacts with
Texas for purposes of specific jurisdiction. In Spir Star AG v. Kimich, the
supreme court held a manufacturer who specifically targets the Texas
market for its products, such as utilizing a distributor based in Texas, will
be subject to jurisdiction in cases arising out of products sold in this
state.2 7 In Zinc Nacional, S.A. v. Bouche Trucking, Inc., on the other
hand, the supreme court held a plaintiff failed to establish that a Mexican
manufacturing company had the requisite minimum contacts with Texas
where the manufacturer merely knew its products would be shipped
through Texas by a third-party trucking company. 28
Finally, IRN Realty Corp. v. Hernandez concerned the nature and ex-
tent of discovery a trial court should allow a plaintiff prior to ruling on a
special appearance.2 9 In this case, the trial court granted the plaintiff's
motions to postpone the special appearance hearing and to compel a dep-
osition of the defendant's corporate representative in Texas. When the
defendant failed to appear for the deposition, the trial court refused to
hear the special appearance, and instead struck the defendant's pleading
and entered a default judgment. Although careful to note that it did not
condone the defendant's refusal to obey the trial court's order compelling
the deposition, the Eastland Court of Appeals nevertheless held the trial
court abused its discretion in abating the special appearance hearing,
compelling the deposition, and sanctioning the defendant.30 The court of
appeals explained that while Rule 120a3 1 would have allowed the plaintiff
to obtain a continuance of the special appearance hearing if she demon-
strated by affidavit a need for jurisdictional discovery to respond to the
special appearance, the plaintiff made no such showing.32
IV. VENUE
As most practitioners are aware,
A trial court abuses its discretion in refusing to enforce a forum-
selection clause unless the party opposing enforcement of the clause
can clearly show that (1) enforcement would be unreasonable or un-
just, (2) the clause is invalid for reasons of fraud or overreaching, (3)
26. Id. at 660.
27. Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Tex. 2010). The supreme court also
rejected the defendant's arguments that it was not subject to jurisdiction because it trans-
ferred title to the products in Europe and did not directly receive any profits realized by
the Texas distributorship upon the distributorship's sale of its products in Texas. Id. at
875-76.
28. Zinc National, S.A. v. Bouche Trucking, Inc., 308 S.W.3d 395, 397-98 (Tex. 2010).
29. IRN Realty Corp. v. Hernandez, 300 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2009,
no pet.).
30. Id.
31. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
32. Hernandez, 300 S.W.3d at 903.
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enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum
where the suit was brought, or (4) the selected forum would be seri-
ously inconvenient for trial.33
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court twice confirmed
that, barring exceptional circumstances, it would continue to enforce fo-
rum selection clauses. In In re ADM Investor Services, Inc., the plaintiff
sued two defendants, one which was subject to a contractual forum selec-
tion clause.34 The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss
based on the forum selection clause, concluding it was unreasonable to
require the plaintiff to pursue the same cause of action against two de-
fendants in different states. The Texas Supreme Court disagreed; how-
ever, holding the plaintiff failed to meet her "heavy burden" of
establishing that enforcing the forum selection clause would be "unrea-
sonable or unjust, or seriously inconvenient. ' 35 The supreme court found
that if forum selection clauses could be avoided by merely adding other
defendants not subject to the clause, they would have very little to no
value.36 Similarly, in In re Laibe Corp., the Texas Supreme Court re-
jected the plaintiff's argument that the forum selection clause should not
be enforced because it would cause significant financial hardship.37 The
supreme court again explained that "'[i]f merely stating that financial and
logistical difficulties will preclude litigation in another state suffices to
avoid a forum-selection clause, the clauses are practically useless." 38
V. PARTIES
In McKnight v. Meller, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the statute of
limitations was not equitably tolled under the "misidentification" doc-
trine.39 The plaintiff filed suit against Meller asserting claims arising out
of a car accident. In response to written discovery requests, and approxi-
mately one month before limitations ran, Derek L. Meller disclosed that
his son, Derek B. Meller, was the person actually driving the car. Ap-
proximately six months later, the plaintiff amended his petition to add
Derek B. Meller as a defendant. The trial court granted Derek B.
Meller's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the claims
were barred by limitations. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that limita-
tions should be equitably tolled under the doctrine of "misidentification."
The court of appeals first explained the difference between "misiden-
tification" and "misnomer. ' 40 In cases of misidentification, "two separate
legal entities exist and a plaintiff mistakenly sues an entity with a name
33. See, e.g., In re Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 257 S.W.3d 228, 231-32 (Tex. 2008).
34. In re ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 304 S.W.3d 371, 373 (Tex. 2010).
35. Id. at 375.
36. Id.
37. In re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d 314, 317-18 (Tex. 2010).
38. Id. at 318 (quoting In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 113 (Tex. 2004)).
39. McKnight v. Meller, No. 05-09-00596-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 2120, at *3-5
(Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 25), pet. denied, 2010 Tex. LEXIS 660 (Tex. Sep. 3, 2010).
40. Id. at *3-4.
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similar to that of the correct entity," and the limitations period is not
tolled.41 In "misnomer" cases, the plaintiff has merely misnamed the cor-
rect defendant, and limitations is tolled.42 Here, the plaintiff argued that
limitations should be tolled because Derek B. Meller had actual knowl-
edge of the lawsuit, was not misled by the misidentification, and suffered
no prejudice. The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that,
while prejudice is a relevant factor where the defendant is a corporate or
other entity that had a business relationship with the plaintiff, it is not a
relevant factor in cases involving individuals. 43
In In re Guetersloh, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held an individual
trustee could not represent himself pro se in that capacity. 44 The trustee
argued that because claims against a trust must be asserted against the
trustee, Rule 745 allows an individual trustee to appear pro se. The court
of appeals disagreed, holding that the situation was more akin to a corpo-
ration because the trustee appeared in a representative capacity; thus the
trustee was not entitled to the right of personal representation. 46
VI. PLEADINGS
In Shutter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the Dallas Court of Appeals con-
sidered the effect of a defective verification in a forcible entry and de-
tainer action.47 Here, the plaintiff's petition was supported by a
verification stating the facts in the petition were true and correct "to the
best of my knowledge. ' 48 The trial court granted possession to the plain-
tiff, and the defendant appealed arguing that (1) the defective verification
made the petition "invalid" and therefore deprived the court of jurisdic-
tion, and (2) the trial court should have granted his request for a plea in
abatement.
The court of appeals first determined that the defendant's jurisdictional
argument failed because the defective verification "did not deprive the
county court of jurisdiction to hear the forcible detainer action. '49 The
court then held that to prevail on a plea in abatement, the moving party
must "identify any impediment to the continuation of the suit, identify an
effective cure, and ask the court to abate the suit until the defect is cor-
rected. '50 The defendant must also demonstrate some harm if the suit is
not abated. Applying these factors, the court of appeals held the defen-
41. Id.
42. Id. at *4.
43. Id. at *4-5.
44. In re Guetersloh, 326 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2010, orig.
proceeding).
45. TEX. R. Civ. P. 7 provides that "[any party to a suit may appear and prosecute or
defend his rights therein, either in person or by an attorney of the court."
46. Guetersloh, 326 S.W.3d at 740.




50. Id. at 470.
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dant failed to show how the defective verification was an impediment to
continuation of the suit or how he had been harmed. 51
VII. DISCOVERY
The Texas Supreme Court continued to encourage trial courts to guard
against overbroad discovery requests in In re Deere & Co.52 In this prod-
uct liability case, the supreme court held that, while a trial court properly
limited the plaintiff's document requests regarding the defendant's back-
hoes to those models equipped with the allegedly defective feature, the
trial court abused its discretion by failing to include a reasonable time
limit on the request.53
A request for an apex deposition was at issue in In re Continental Air-
lines, Inc.54 Following a no-fatality accident, Continental's chief execu-
tive officer (CEO) and chairman of the board held a press conference
where the CEO promised a full investigation and subsequently sent a let-
ter of apology to the flight's passengers. The trial court granted the plain-
tiffs' request to depose the CEO, but limited the deposition to two hours
and restricted the subject matter to his actions and statements relating to
the crash. The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that allowing
this limited deposition was an abuse of discretion.55 The court of appeals
explained that the CEO had no unique or personal knowledge of the
crash or investigation because the information he provided at the press
conference was conveyed to him by other Continental employees; fur-
thermore, the plaintiffs had not shown that less intrusive discovery, such
as deposing other employees more directly involved with the crash inves-
tigation, would be inadequate. 56
In Heerden v. Heerden, a divorce action, an appellant-wife complained
of the trial court's exclusion of three witnesses based on her failure to
adequately describe their connection to the case in responding to her hus-
band's requests for disclosure.5 7 The husband objected that her disclo-
sures failed to give any information of what the witnesses knew or would
testify to. The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held the husband
read an "unnecessarily onerous" requirement into the disclosure rule.58
The court of appeals explained that Rule 194.2(e) 59 requires only a brief
statement of a person's connection to the case; in the context of this di-
vorce proceeding, identifying the potential witnesses as the wife's father
51. Id.
52. In re Deere & Co., 299 S.W.3d 819, 820 (Tex. 2009).
53. Id. at 821.
54. In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 305 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2010, orig. proceeding).
55. Id. at 859.
56. Id. at 858-59.
57. Heerden v. Heerden, 321 S.W.3d 869, 875 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010,
no pet.) (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 194.2(e)).
58. Id. at 876.
59. TEX. R. Civ. P. 194.2(e).
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or sister was sufficient to satisfy this requirement.60
As Texas courts continue to struggle with the procedures for and limi-
tations on electronic discovery, In re Harris illustrates that such discovery
is now a common feature of modern litigation that does not alone justify
appointment of a special master.61 The trial court in this case ordered a
defendant to produce his computer hard drive and external drives for an
independent forensic examination by the plaintiff's consultant.62 The
First District Court of Appeals held this was an abuse of discretion be-
cause the trial court failed to follow standards for entry of this type of
order set forth in the rules of procedure and Texas Supreme Court prece-
dent.63 Moreover, the court of appeals explained that a forensics exam-
iner is not the same as a special master appointed under Rule 171. 64
Thus, the trial court's order conferring certain powers of a special master
on plaintiff's retained consultant was also error.65
The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the identity of a defendant's
jury consultant was protected work product in In re Jefferson County Ap-
praisal District.66 Through deposition of one of defendant's testifying ex-
perts, the plaintiff learned that the defendant conducted a mock trial
using a jury consultant. The defendant allowed the testifying expert to
answer numerous questions about his recollection of the mock trial, but
objected when the plaintiff then asked for supplemental discovery re-
sponses identifying the jury consultant and allowing him to be deposed.
The court of appeals held the trial court's order compelling this discovery
was in error. 67 Specifically, the court explained that the defendant did
not waive the work product privilege by allowing the expert to testify
about his own knowledge of the mock trial because the expert had not
seen a copy of the jury consultant's report and was not otherwise given
any privileged information in connection with his attendance at the mock
trial.68
Another discovery rule, Rule 192.3(g), allows a party to discover the
existence and contents of settlement agreements. 69 In In re Univar USA,
Inc., the Beaumont Court of Appeals held this rule means what it says,
rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that their settlement amounts with other
60. Heerden, 321 S.W.3d at 876.
61. In re Harris, 315 S.W.3d 685, 705 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, orig.
proceeding).
62. Id. at 700.
63. Id. at 700-02 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 196.4 and In re Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d
309 (Tex. 2009)).
64. TEX. R. Civ. P. 171.
65. Harris, 35 S.W.3d at 704-05.
66. In re Jefferson Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 315 S.W.3d 229, 233-34 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 2010, orig. proceeding).
67. Id. at 230-31.
68. Id. at 235. The court also held the plaintiff's interrogatory asking for identity of
other persons who attended the mock trial was irrelevant and outside the permissible
scope of discovery. Id. at 237.
69. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.3(g).
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defendants were confidential. 70 The court of appeals explained the rule
does not make terms of a settlement conditionally discoverable only after
a verdict solely to compute applicable settlement credits, thereby implic-
itly recognizing the relevance of this information for other reasons as
well, and requiring its production before trial.71
Finally, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals rejected the use of an
order disqualifying a party's counsel as a discovery sanction in In re Voss-
dale Townhouse Ass'n. 72 In this nuisance suit, the plaintiffs' attorney
served 31,448 requests for admissions and 1,136 requests for production
on eight defendants. Although the court of appeals agreed the plaintiffs'
discovery requests were sanctionable and expressed "great empathy" for
the trial court's frustration with such tactics, the court of appeals held
even the most egregious discovery abuse should not override a party's
fundamental right to counsel of its choice. 73
VIII. DISMISSAL
The Texas Supreme Court in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Joachim held a
trial court's accidental entry of a dismissal order for want of prosecution
with prejudice, after the plaintiff filed a notice of nonsuit without
prejudice, barred a subsequent suit by the plaintiff under the doctrine of
res judicata.74 The plaintiff filed his notice of nonsuit without prejudice
the day before trial. Several months later, however, the trial court sent a
notice stating the case would be dismissed for want of prosecution if a
final order was not filed. The plaintiff claimed to have not received either
the dismissal notice or the ensuing order, and therefore did not perfect an
appeal or challenge the dismissal order while the trial court retained juris-
diction. When the plaintiff refiled suit, the defendant successfully moved
for summary judgment on the basis of res judicata, but the Amarillo
Court of Appeals reversed. The supreme court then reversed the court of
appeals, holding the dismissal with prejudice-though erroneously en-
tered after the plaintiff filed his nonsuit-was only voidable and not
void. 75 Because the plaintiff did not timely challenge the original dismis-
sal with prejudice, res judicata barred the second suit.76
In Christensen v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., the Dallas Court of Appeals
held that "Mother Hubbard" language ("[a]ll relief prayed for but not
expressly granted herein is denied") in an order dismissing a case for
want of prosecution did not constitute a dismissal with prejudice for pur-
70. In re Univar USA, Inc., 311 S.W.3d 175, 179-81 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2010, orig.
proceeding).
71. Id. at 181.
72. In re Vossdale Townhouse Ass'n, 302 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2009, orig. proceeding).
73. Id. at 895.
74. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 861, 866 (Tex. 2010).
75. Id. at 863-65.
76. Id. at 865-66.
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poses of res judicata.77 The court of appeals recognized that while a num-
ber of its sister courts had reached the opposite conclusion, it declined to
follow them because they failed to explain their rationale.
78
Upon timely notice, a plaintiff has an absolute right to nonsuit a case if
the defendant has not asserted a claim for affirmative relief.79 In In re
Riggs, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held a plaintiff retained this right
to nonsuit his claims without prejudice, even where the trial court already
granted a motion compelling arbitration. 80 The court of appeals reasoned
a motion to compel arbitration is not an independent, affirmative claim
for relief, and therefore did not affect the plaintiff's right to nonsuit.
8 1
In Dao v. Le, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held the trial
court erred in dismissing a case for want of prosecution where the plain-
tiffs' counsel appeared at trial ready to prosecute their case, but the plain-
tiffs did not personally appear.82 The court of appeals held that
appearance of plaintiffs' counsel as their agent was sufficient and allowed
them to proceed with their case.83 Moreover, the fact that the plaintiffs
were subpoenaed to appear and testify was irrelevant because dismissal
of their case was not a recognized sanction for violating a subpoena.
8 4
IX. JURY PRACTICE
In Showbiz Multimedia, LLC v. Mountain States Mortgage Centers,
Inc., the First District Court of Appeals held that statements made by
defense counsel during closing argument-that plaintiff's use of the
courts was "judicial terrorism" and extortion and that a witness was
"scared to death" of the plaintiff because of "cultural issues"-consti-
tuted incurable jury argument.85 The plaintiff in this case was a natural-
ized American citizen born in India. The court of appeals held this type
of improper appeal to race or nationalism "strikes at the heart of the jury
trial system and [is] incurable. '86
The Tyler Court of Appeals held in McKenna v. W & W Services, Inc.
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the plain-
77. Christensen v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 304 S.W.3d 548, 553-54 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las 2010), pet. denied, 2010 Tex. LEXIS 530 (Tex. July 30, 2010).
78. Id. at 554.
79. TEX. R. Civ. P. 162; see, e.g., Joachim, 315 S.W.3d at 862.
80. In re Riggs, 315 S.W.3d 613, 615-16 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010, orig.
proceeding).
81. Id. at 616.
82. Dao v. Le, No. 14-08-01113-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 473, at *5 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 26, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).
83. Id. at *4-5.
84. Id. at *5 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 176.8).
85. Showbiz Multimedia, LLC v. Mountain States Mortgage Ctrs., Inc., 303 S.W.3d
769, 771-72 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
86. Id. at 772. But cf Cottman Transmission Sys., L.L.C. v. FVLR Enters., L.L.C., 295
S.W.3d 372, 379-80 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009) (holding that referring to the plaintiff's pres-
ident as a "Philadelphia Lawyer" during closing argument was not reversible error where
the witness testified he was an attorney who graduated from Temple University's law
school in Philadelphia), pet. denied, 2010 Tex. LEXIS 5 (Tex. Jan. 8, 2010).
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tiff's Batson challenge after the defendant used all of its peremptory chal-
lenges to strike six females from the venire in a gender discrimination
case.87 The defendant's attorney was able to articulate gender-neutral
reasons for each of his strikes, including sufficiently specific "demeanor"
explanations, and the court of appeals held that the plaintiff could not
meet her burden of proving these reasons were pretextual merely by ex-
pressing disbelief.88 Neither side "elicited detailed information" about
the venire members during jury selection, nor did they introduce the
"jur[y] questionnaires, the jury list, or the strikes of either party into evi-
dence"; accordingly, the court of appeals could not conduct a "compara-
tive juror analysis." 89 Finally, the court of appeals noted that, although
"17 of the 24 potential jurors within the strike zone" were female, the
defendant did not request a jury shuffle or ask the male and female ve-
nire members conflicting questions on the same subject. 90
X. JUDGMENTS
The Texas Supreme Court again addressed the question of when a
judgment is final in In re Daredia.91 In this mandamus proceeding, the
plaintiffs sued both a corporate defendant and its individual owner over a
credit card debt. The plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against the
corporate defendant when it failed to answer. Although the individual
defendant filed an answer, the trial court's default judgment against the
corporate entity stated it disposed all parties and all claims, and was a
final judgment. After the trial court's plenary jurisdiction expired, the
plaintiffs successfully moved for a judgment nunc pro tunc to restyle it as
interlocutory because it was not meant to dispose of the claims against
the individual defendant who had answered. The supreme court granted
mandamus relief, holding the clear and unequivocal language of the judg-
ment made it final. 92 Moreover, the trial court's error in rendering the
judgment was a judicial, rather than a clerical error; thus, the trial court
could not use a judgment nunc pro tunc to modify the final judgment
after its plenary power expired. 93
A judgment becomes dormant if no writ of execution is issued within
ten years after it is rendered, 94 but it can be revived if a petition for writ
87. McKenna v. W & W Servs., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2009), pet.
denied, 2010 Tex. LEXIS 518 (Tex. July 16, 2010).
88. Id. at 343-44.
89. Id. at 344.
90. Id.
91. See In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d 247, 249 (Tex. 2010).
92. Id.; see also Vaughn v. Drennon, 324 S.W.3d 560, 561 (Tex. 2010) (reaffirming the
rule that a judgment entered following "conventional trial on the merits" is presumed to be
final, even if it fails to address claims against certain parties).
93. Daredia, 317 S.W.3d at 249-50; see also Rawlins v. Rawlins, 324 S.W.3d 852,
855-57 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (holding that error in agreed final
divorce decree signed by trial court, which specified child support payments begin on a
date before the parents separated and divorce suit was filed, was judicial and not clerical
error).
94. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 34.001(a) (West Supp. 2010).
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of scire facias is filed within two years after the judgment becomes dor-
mant.95 In Cadles of Grassy Meadow, II, LLC v. Herbert, the Amarillo
Court of Appeals determined whether a writ of scire facias was timely
filed within twelve years of the date the written judgment was entered;
but not within twelve years of an earlier date shown on the docket sheet
as the date the parties advised the trial court they had settled and would
present an agreed judgment.96 Because there was no reporter's record
reflecting whether the trial court actually rendered judgment orally on
the earlier date, the appellate court deemed the writ of scire facias timely
based upon the date of the written judgment.97
In PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, the San Antonio Court of Appeals al-
lowed a default judgment against a defendant to stand even though a
federal district court had previously granted summary judgment for the
defendant on the same claims. 98 The defendant removed the plaintiff's
original personal injury suit to federal court where summary judgment
was entered in the defendant's favor. However, the federal court's order
stated it was dismissing the plaintiff's claims without prejudice. The
plaintiff then refiled the case in state court. Although the plaintiff served
the defendant's registered agent in the second suit (just as she had the
first time), the defendant failed to answer and the trial court entered a
default judgment in favor of the plaintiff for approximately $1.4 million.
The defendant did not timely move for a new trial or appeal the default
judgment. When the plaintiff initiated collection efforts nine years later,
the defendant filed a bill of review challenging the default judgment
based on the federal court's prior summary judgment order. The defen-
dant also obtained an order nunc pro tunc from the federal court, cor-
recting its summary judgment to reflect a dismissal with prejudice. The
trial court still granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The
court of appeals affirmed, holding that even if the federal court judgment
were preclusive (an issue the court of appeals did not reach), it would not
render the state court default judgment void.99 In the absence of evi-
dence of extrinsic fraud, therefore, the defendant's bill of review was
untimely. 100
XI. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
In In re United Scaffolding, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court reiterated
that a trial court abuses its discretion in granting a motion for new trial
95. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.006 (West 2008).
96. Cadles of Grassy Meadow, II, LLC v. Herbert, No. 07-09-00190-CV, 2010 Tex.
App. LEXIS 3147, at *1 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Apr. 27, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).
97. Id. at *17. But cf Greene v. State, 324 S.W.3d 276, 280-81, 285 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2010, no pet.) (holding that where a letter ruling issued before a judge retired ex-
pressly stated she was rendering judgment, the judge had authority to perform a clerical
duty of signing a written judgment after expiration of her term).
98. PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, No. 04-09-00561-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8769, at
*1-3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Nov. 3, 2010, pet. filed).
99. Id. at *14-18.
100. Id. at *21-26.
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that disregards a jury verdict when it fails to articulate a reason for that
decision beyond "the interest of justice and fairness." 10 1 Following the
supreme court's decision, the trial court entered a second order granting
a new trial stating four reasons for its decision. However, the trial court
separated the four grounds with the phrase "and/or" and gave as its last
reason "the interest of justice and fairness. ' 10 2 The Beaumont Court of
Appeals denied the defendant's petition for mandamus relief, which con-
tended that the trial court failed to adequately articulate the bases for its
decision.10 3 While critical of the trial court's use of the phrase "and/or"
between the grounds because of its propensity to create ambiguity, the
court of appeals concluded the stated grounds were sufficiently detailed
and complied with the supreme court's mandate of specificity in granting
motions for new trial.1° 4 The court of appeals also held the trial court
was not required to make specific references to evidence adduced at trial
in its order granting a new trial. 10 5
In McClellan v. HICA Education Loan Corp., the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals dismissed an appeal from an order denying a second motion for
new trial because the trial court already denied the original new trial mo-
tion before the second motion was filed.10 6 The court of appeals held the
second motion was untimely and did not extend the trial court's plenary
power.10 7 The order denying the second motion, entered after the trial
court's plenary power expired, was therefore void, and the court of ap-
peals lacked jurisdiction over the attempted appeal therefrom.1 0 8
Finally, the San Antonio Court of Appeals in In re Northern Natural
Gas Co. faced an unusual situation in which a trial court timely granted a
motion for new trial on damages, but attempted to defer a ruling on the
part of the motion regarding liability to a date after its plenary power
would ordinarily expire. 10 9 The court of appeals granted a writ of manda-
mus, noting a trial court's jurisdiction to rule on a motion for new trial
under Rule 329b" ° cannot be extended beyond the time period pre-
scribed in that rule.1"' Therefore, the court of appeals held the portion of
the trial court's order setting a hearing on the new trial motion's liability
grounds for a date after the trial court's plenary power expired was
101. In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 661, 662 (Tex. 2010) (citing In re Colum-
bia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, 290 S.W.3d 204, 206 (Tex. 2009)).
102. In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 315 S.W.3d 246, 247-48 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
2010, orig. proceeding).
103. Id. at 247.
104. Id. at 248-49.
105. Id. at 249-51.
106. McClellan v. HICA Educ. Loan Corp., 312 S.W.3d 291,293-94 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2010, no pet.).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 294.
109. In re N. Natural Gas Co., 327 S.W.3d 181, 184-85 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2010,
orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
110. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
111. N. Natural Gas, 327 S.W.3d at 186.
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void.1 12 However, the holding appears inconsistent with the Texas Su-
preme Court's decision in In re Baylor Medical Center at Garland, which
overturned the old Texas rule prohibiting a trial court from "ungranting"
a prior order that granted a new trial after the date where its plenary
power would have expired if the original judgment had instead become
final. 113 As discussed in that case, a trial court's plenary power does not
expire after a vacated judgment, only after a final judgment, and the su-
preme court therefore rejected imposition of a hypothetical deadline cal-
culated from the date of the original, vacated judgment. 114 This
reasoning points toward the opposite conclusion from that reached by the
San Antonio Court of Appeals in Northern Natural Gas.
XII. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
In De Gonzalez v. Guilbot, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the
meaning of the term "tertiary recusal motion." 115 Section 30.016(a) of
the Civil Practice and Remedies Code states a "'tertiary recusal motion'
means a third or subsequent motion for recusal or disqualification filed
against a district court or statutory county court judge by the same party
in a case."11 6 Unlike the procedure for other recusal motions, if a judge
declines to recuse herself in response to a tertiary recusal motion, she
may continue to preside in the case while the motion is determined by
another judge.117 In Guilbot, the supreme court rejected the argument
that only a third motion filed against the same judge is considered a terti-
ary recusal motion, holding such an interpretation is unsupported by the
statutory text and would lead to the absurd result of allowing a party to
file endless recusal motions against successive judges in one case.' 18
XIII. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
More than fifteen years ago, the Texas Supreme Court held a law firm
is not necessarily disqualified from a matter when it hires a nonlawyer
employee, such as a legal assistant, who previously worked on the same
112. Id. at 186-87, 189.
113. In re Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland, 280 S.W.3d 227, 228 (Tex. 2008).
114. Id. at 230-31.
115. De Gonzalez v. Guilbot, 315 S.W.3d 533, 534 (Tex. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
951 (2011).
116. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 30.016(a) (West 2008).
117. See id. § 30.016(b)-(c).
118. Guilbot, 315 S.W.3d at 540. Guilbot was decided under a prior version of section
30.016(a), which included statutory probate court judges within its ambit. Id. In 2007,
section 30.016(a) was amended to delete any reference to probate judges, and a similar
provision governing tertiary recusal motions against probate judges was added to the Gov-
ernment Code at the same time. Id. The new Government Code provision is explicit that
the term "tertiary recusal motion" is not limited to the motions filed against the same
judge. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 25.00256(a) (West Supp. 2010). Nevertheless, the su-
preme court rejected the defendants' argument in Guilbot that the addition of this lan-
guage to the Government Code provision demonstrates section 30.016(a) encompasses
only recusal motions filed against the same judge. Guilbot, 315 S.W.3d at 540.
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matter for the opposing law firm. 119 To avoid disqualification, however,
the firm must demonstrate the employee was "instructed not to work on
[the] matter" and that the firm took "other reasonable steps" to ensure
he or she did not do so. 120 In In re Columbia Valley Healthcare System,
L.P., the Texas Supreme Court announced its intent to clarify what types
of "reasonable steps" a firm must take to effectively screen a nonlawyer
employee to satisfy the second prong of this test. 12 ' The supreme court
specifically noted mere admonitions to the employee, even accompanied
by a threat of termination, are not sufficient. 122 Instead, the firm must
implement "formal, institutionalized screening measures that render the
possibility of the nonlawyer having contact with the file less likely. '"123
Other than noting that the screened employee should not be directed to
perform even clerical tasks relating to the matter, the opinion unfortu-
nately offers little guidance to the trial bar as to what these screening
measures look like in practice.'2 4
The San Antonio Court of Appeals held one of its former justices was
disqualified from representing a party in a mandamus proceeding in In re
de Brittingham. 25 The former justice had served on the panel that heard
a prior appeal arising out of the same probate case, and Texas Discipli-
nary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.11(a) provides that a "lawyer shall
not represent" a party in "a matter" in which she has previously served
"as an adjudicatory official.' 26 Noting that it was an issue of first im-
pression in Texas, the court of appeals held that the term "matter" was
not limited to a particular discrete appeal or mandamus, but instead in-
cluded the entire underlying probate proceeding. 127 Moreover, the court
of appeals held that the party seeking disqualification was not required to
establish that he had been prejudiced. 128
XIV. MISCELLANEOUS
In East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., Inc. v. Werline, the Texas Su-
preme Court considered whether under the Texas General Arbitration
Act (TAA) 129 a party can "appeal from a trial court's order that denies
confirmation of an arbitration award and instead, vacates the award and
directs that the dispute be arbitrated anew.' 130 In this employment dis-
119. Phoenix Founders, Inc. v. Marshall, 887 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Tex. 1994).
120. Id. at 835.
121. In re Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P., 320 S.W.3d 819, 825 (Tex. 2010).
122. Id. at 826.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 828.
125. In re de Brittingham, 319 S.W.3d 95, 97-98 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2010, orig.
proceeding).
126. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.11(a), reprinted in TEX. Gov'T CODE
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2005) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X § 9).
127. de Brittingham, 319 S.W.3d at 98-99.
128. Id. at 100-01.
129. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.001-.098 (West 2011).
130. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., Inc. v. Werline, 307 S.W.3d 267, 268 (Tex. 2010).
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pute, the arbitrator found for the ex-employee. On cross-motions in the
trial court, the employee sought confirmation of the award, and the em-
ployer moved to vacate the award on the ground that it was so contrary
to the evidence that it was arbitrary and capricious and the arbitrator
must have been biased. The trial court denied the employee's request for
confirmation and vacated the arbitration award, holding that "the mate-
rial factual findings in the Award are so against the evidence... that they
manifest gross mistakes in fact and law.' 31 Indeed, the trial court made
its own factual findings adverse to the employee, and entered judgment
requiring the matter be submitted to a new arbitrator with the "sole issue
before that Arbitrator being whether or not there was a material breach
of the Employment Agreement .. .consistent with the findings in this
Judgment."' 32 The employee appealed and the court of appeals reversed
the trial court's judgment confirming the arbitration award.a33 In re-
sponse, the employer petitioned the supreme court, arguing that the court
of appeals did not have jurisdiction under section 171.098(a) of the
TAA..3 4 Although it appeared the appellate court's judgment expressly
fell within section 171.098(a)(3), the employer argued that section
171.098(a)(5) implied "that a court order vacating an award and directing
a rehearing [was] not appealable," thereby creating "an exception to sub-
section (3).' '135 The supreme court, however, rejected the company's ar-
gument and found the trial court's judgment was appealable, and the
court of appeals therefore had jurisdiction over the matter. 136
XV. CONCLUSION
The Texas Supreme Court demonstrated during the Survey period a
continued willingness to address recurring procedural issues faced by trial
and appellate courts. While most of these decisions did not break signifi-
cant new ground, the supreme court created an expanding body of proce-
dural precedent to guide lower courts in coming years.
131. Id. at 269 (alteration in original).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 269-70.
134. Id. at 270. Section 171.098(a) provides that:
A party may appeal a judgment or decree entered under this chapter or an
order:
(1) denying an application to compel arbitration ..
(2) granting an application to stay arbitration ... ;
(3) confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(4) modifying or correcting an award; or
(5) vacating an award without directing a rehearing. Id. (citing
§ 171.098(a)).
135. Id.
136. See id. at 274.
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